most radical patriots (Thomas Paine, Jefferson, Dr. Thomas Young, Samuel Adams, Ebenezer McIntosh, Ethan Allen), and virtually all of the loyalists. To put the matter differently, antievangelicals supplied nearly all positions of leadership, both radical and moderate, within the patriot camp-signers of the Declaration of Independence, members of Congress and the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, army commanders, and even the sons of liberty and the organizers of anti-British mobs. With a few exceptions that will shortly be noted, evangelicals followed but did not lead. Antievangelicals defined the terms of resistance to Britain, guided the republic to victory, set most of the agenda for the "internal revolution" after 1776, and wrote (and probably led resistance to) the Constitution of 1787.
A frank class analysis could resolve this enigma if it could demonstrate that evangelicals clustered among the "meaner sort" but used their weight to give power to those antievangelicals among the elite who shared their social goals. Nash and Stout flirt with such an interpretation but do not state it explicitly; both are doubtless aware of numerous exceptions to any such pattern. As a result, the debate continues, but increasingly without any sharp focus. It no longer seems obvious what aspect of the Revolution the Awakening is supposed to explain.
Counterfactual arguments have their terrors for historians, especially when they lack a rigorous statistical base. Yet, as I argued ten years ago in discussing the impact of the Canada cession upon the Revolution, they can also clarify issues that have become muddied and suggest useful avenues for future research. The historiography of the Awakening has reached just such an impasse. One way of realizing where we are is to obliterate the Awakening and then try to discover what remains in its absence. This exercise, for all the risk of indiscipline it entails, might at least tell us what we are trying to say. 3 Of course in annihilating a major historical event, we should make as few actual changes in the known record as are needed to procure the result. I propose to remove from the scene, before certain critical points in their careers, the three men who did most to make the Awakening a North American and trans-Atlantic event: George Whitefield, Jonathan Edwards, and Gilbert Tennent. More than any other person, Whitefield drew together into a common experience the separate, local revivals that had agitated parts of the British world by 1740. In his absence, these local upheavals can continue to wax and wane much as they had been doing since the 1690s, but they will never reach the threshold of general awareness of "a great and extraordinary outpouring of the Spirit." To sustain our enterprise, he must disappear before 1739. Similarly, Edwards not only provided the Awakening with its most sophisticated theological exposition, but he also created a literary genre of crucial importance to its success-the published revival narrative, which Elsewhere we can record evangelical support for independence, but its decisiveness seems highly dubious. Massachusetts Baptists, the most evangelical group in the province by the 1770s, were caught largely by surprise during the rush of events. So indifferent had many of them been to imperial issues that their neighbors suspected them of loyalism. They had played no conspicuous part in the resistance movement, but now at the culminating stage they climbed aboard. Similarly Virginia Baptists had struggled for a decade against the Anglican gentry who drove the Old Dominion into independence. They too rallied to a cause that others defined, but they seem to have provided no decisive impact upon policy until the fight for Anglican disestablishment in the 1780s.9
Even when a correlation exists, how much can we make of it? Connecticut, for example, appears beguilingly simple and obvious until we ponder the alternatives. A New Light party did lead the colony to independence. But had the Old Lights retained power past 1766, would they have behaved much differently? Governor Fitch, had he remained in office past 1766 and lived past 1774, might indeed have gone loyalist. He showed every sign of such behavior. Yet he probably would have been no more difficult a problem for patriots than loyalist governor Joseph Wanton in neighboring Rhode Island, who was jettisoned in the final crisis. When the crunch came, Connecticut Old Lights rallied overwhelmingly to the Revolution, as did Old Light Congregational clergy throughout New England. The only sizable pocket of loyalism in the state was Anglican, a faith that had grown rapidly in reaction against the Awakening. The argument would be more perverse than any I care to defend, but a case could be made that the net effect of the Awakening was to increase loyalism more than patriotism. More probably, it increased both the number of Anglican loyalists and the intensity of patriot resistance. 10 In Pennsylvania, by contrast, the Revolution often seemed to be almost a civil war between Presbyterians and Quakers. This evaluation, however, does not place the province in the Awakening camp. As with Congregationalists, few prominent Presbyterians, New Side or Old, went loyalist, and the proportion was probably no higher among the inconspicuous and inarticulate. We can, of course, trace the revolutionary activities of such New Side Presbyterians as the Reverend George Duffield of Philadelphia. Even so, the decisive event in Pennsylvania was the rising of backcountry Scots-Irish, many of them without resident clergymen, yet strongly rooted in Ulster traditions of Presbyterianism. Radical as they were (and they soon helped to launch the most daring constitutional experiment of the period), they remained in all likelihood an antievangelical, Old-Side band of patriots. That leaves New Jersey as a fairly unequivocal case of New Lights dragging their fellows into independence and a bracing republican vision of the future. Only months later would the Princeton radicals begin to discover what could happen if they gave a revolution in New Jersey-and nobody came but the Could the military conflict have been won without an Awakening? Here we approach the most difficult and fascinating problem of all. The war, we now realize, was an extremely brutal and draining experience. It stands just behind the Civil War as the most destructive conflict in our history. Did evangelicals somehow provide the resiliency and stamina to endure a struggle that the less righteous would have abandoned? 12 Possibly so. The argument deserves serious consideration and can sustain far more research than it has yet received. Some hasty answers to the problem are clearly inadequate. Perry Miller, for example, has insisted that, while secular leaders spoke their lofty eighteenth-century language of natural rights, ordinary soldiers responded far more warmly to appeals based on biblical covenants. Perhaps. Leaving aside the realization that both Old and New Lights could endorse covenant and even millennial rhetoric, this contention lacks specificity. Does it apply chiefly to the Continental Army, which probably did have a disproportionate share of New Light chaplains? Two strong arguments suggest otherwise. First, the Continentals did not behave that way. They were no reincarnation of Oliver Cromwell's Ironsides from the previous century. Their outlook and grievances were far more secular. They did not defend themselves as the elect of God nor charge into battle chanting Psalms. Some of their chaplains undoubtedly hoped to make things otherwise, which may explain the intense mortification of the Reverend Samuel Spring, a committed evangelical. He learned that during his brief furlough from the Army, his men had rejoiced heartily to be rid of him. Second, most Continentals were the wrong age and probably from the wrong social class to match the profile that has been emerging of who got converted in eighteenth-century revivals. Most of them were too young, and their family and communal roots were too weak. 13 On the other hand, as John Shy and others have contended, maybe the Continentals were not the decisive weapon after all. Maybe the militia really did tip the balance, politicizing the neutral at heart, holding loyal to the patriot cause every area not under British military occupation, and providing logistical support to George Washington and Nathanial Greene, or even desperately needed reinforcements at several critical phases of the contest. Here, if anywhere, we should look for a direct impact of evangelicals upon the military struggle. Did they serve disproportionately in the tiring services required of the militia? This question can be researched but so far has not been. From everything we know about both evangelicals and the militia, we ought to expect richer results here than with the Continental Army. Evangelical conversions occurred most often within established families of church members, and the militia was a communal, family-based institution. For whatever reason, evangelical ministers (unlike Old Lights, who far more often had clerical forebears) were disproportionately descended from militia officers. If the militia really accomplished all that Shy claims, perhaps evangelicals contributed more to the militia than to any other patriot institution. Here above all, a counterfactual question can give us a specific and important problem to investigate.14 Less concretely, the kind of emphasis stressed recently by Stout and Isaac also seems more appropriate to the war years, or at least to the period from 1774 on, than to earlier crises. Both men emphasize the sharp difference between the evangelicals, with their oral, face-to-face culture and emotional sermons, and the older colonial elite, with its polite, urbane, genteel, literary culture. Patrick Henry derived much of his influence, Isaac thoughtfully suggests, from his special talent for bridging the two worlds. Without in any way underplaying the importance of this insight or even trying to suggest that a counterfactual hypothesis can begin to measure its significance, we might still argue that the evangelical style of exhortation found its truest role in winning the war, not bringing it on. Baptists were by far the most vigorous evangelical group in America by the 1770s, but apart from a few individuals such as Elder John Allen of Boston (whose heterodoxy prevented him from winning a pulpit), they have not yet been detected provoking the imperial crisis. They responded to what others created.15
We might also discover that evangelicals contributed significantly to the internal revolution of the 1770s and 1780s. The role of Presbyterians in Virginia and Baptists everywhere in the fight for ecclesiastical disestablishment is too well known to discuss here. But we still do not understand where evangelicals stood on other urgent, nonreligious, social questions. How large a presence were they in the reformed state legislatures of the era? If they appeared in significant numbers, did they cluster with Jackson Turner Main's localists or cosmopolitans? Or did Baptists perhaps behave differently from New Side Presbyterians and New Light Congregationalists in this respect? In New England, for example, Congregational New Lights eventually emerged as Federalists while Baptists went Jeffersonian. If such a split was general, can we speak meaningfully of an evangelical alignment or party in the very early republic? Only when we have mapped the boundaries of the evangelical social vision through rollcall votes and local records can we properly grasp its meaning and impact. 16 The internal revolution leads naturally to our final question, which need not detain us long. Everything we have learned recently about American political culture in the nineteenth century underscores the importance of the evangelical upheaval. In the early eighteenth century, the denominations bidding for hegemony in North America were Congregational, Quaker, and Anglican. As the two Great Awakenings did their work, the lead shifted 
